Th e a rticle d iscusses conceptualisation of populism, L ithuania's party s ystem a nd electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader's intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders' political careers and their electoral activity. Th e L ithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. Th e protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice's internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.
Introduction
Populism as a phenomenon is relevant for empirical and theoretical reasons in the last two decades. First, the media, albeit pejoratively, is replete with references to mushrooming populist parties and movements. Political leaders such as Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duerte, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orban, to mention a few, are frequently accredited with populist features of the right. On the other hand, Evo Morales, Andrés Manuel López Obrador or the late president Hugo Chávez, along with Greek Syriza or Spanish Podemos, attest left ist populism. Populist parties on the far-left and far-right have 7 (1)/2019 eration between ex-communists and anti-communists and thwarted the emergence of the transformation of liberal post-communism to populist post-communism.
Ainė Ramonaitė and Vesta Ratkevičiūtė (2013) argued that the Party Order and Justice has been the most conspicuous example of so-called right-wing populism and anti-establishment organisation in the 2000s. It clearly lacked anti-immigrant or anti-minorities attitudes, thus making the radical right poorly represented in Lithuanian politics.
Dovaidas Pabiržis (2013) analysed the support for populist parties in the Baltic States and found that Estonian populist parties were the most successful in terms of received votes and the Latvian populism was least visible with Lithuania standing in the middle.
Gintaras Aleknonis and Renata Matkevičienė (2016) pondered whether populism was understood as a political style of anti-elitist communication used by political newcomers; the Party Order and Justice, the Labour Party, the National Resurrection Party and the Party 'Way of Courage' have employed anti-establishment rhetoric the most.
Daunis Auers (2017) compared populist tendencies in politics in all three Baltics States and analysed the Lithuanian case of the former president Rolandas Paksas, who presented himself as a political outsider. Paksas' claims about corruption in the country, the infl uence of domestic and foreign interest groups, let alone low trust in democracy, parliament, parties and the political establishment fl amed a populist address. Building on the topic, Daunis Auers (2018) argued the institutionalisation of a political party explains the differing impact of populist political parties -the legal framework that regulates party organisations and electoral participation makes room for populist parties. He also described diff erent populist parties that have recently manifested in the Baltic States. Low barriers to enter the party system allowed populist parties to succeed.
Finally, Jogilė Ulinskaitė (2018) argued two populist parties, the Lithuanian Peasants' and Greens Union and the Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles -Union of Christian Families, are represented in the Lithuanian parliament now. Discourse of Lithuanian populist parties, according to her, reveals left ist populism.
Th is article consists of several parts. First comes a short overview of contemporary populism. Th en the focus shift s towards a brief history of Lithuanian politics in 1990-2019, the introduction to the electoral system, the characterisation of the party system dynamics and key electoral indices. Th ird, the empirical part examines ex-protest-turned-mainstream party, Party Order and Justice presenting its electoral performance and dynamics of leadership in terms of its electoral results, selection, intra-party relevance and political genesis.
Populism as concept and context
Today's populism bears quite a few negative connotations; however, its phenomenon in history is equivocal. Populism can rally people on pro-democratic credentials in the fi ght against non-democratic regimes. Nation-building and calls for democratisation in former Russian, German, Spanish and Austro-Hungarian empires in the 19 th and 20 th centuries, decolonisation in Africa in the mid-20 th century, the peaceful revolutions in Central Europe and the Baltic States in the late 1980s are clear examples of populist movements against oppression. Electoral rules drive political contenders into populist rhetoric too. Dichotomous political choices can serve as a platform for populism. For instance, a run-off in presidential elections will almost inevitably trigger candidates to address all 'the people' and representation of their needs. Referenda also ask what is best for the populace.
Historically, post-industrialisation, globalism, the weakening of nation-states and the thaw of societal cleavages led to the arrival of new protest parties in 1970s Europe. Quite a few of them had an anti-establishment streak and spoke against the ossifi ed political establishment yet made mixed and unsustainable inroads in the political arena. Th e manifestation of anti-EU, anti-immigrant, anti-globalisation and other antagonistic parties in the 1990s reignited the emergence of populism. Populist far-right parties such as the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Danish People's Party bore nativist and racist features glorifying 'real people' and tarnishing minorities and immigrants. Th e economic meltdown aft er the 2008 fi nancial crisis, migration to wealthy Western countries and the increasing inequality (Piketty 2013) have further de-aligned electoral loyalty and directed dissatisfaction towards the political, business and media elite. Reactions to economic insecurity in post-industrial economies, immigrants and progressive values have increasingly found channels of discontent in new parties aft er 2008.
Th eoretical and methodological debates about populism have not yet arrived at the consensus. Cas Mudde (2004, 532) defi ned populism as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people." Populism embraces the existence of two homogeneous groups -'the people' and 'the elite' -with an antagonistic relationship between each other, supports the idea of sovereignty of people, praises 'the people' and scorns 'the elite'. Populists imagine politics as a fi ght between vox populi and the 'liberal' establishment with vested interests by emphasising the triumph of people's will (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015) . Th erefore, in the eyes of populists, direct democracy in forms of referenda or plebiscites install the will of the majority, whereas the separation of powers, rights of minorities, the role of independent media and tedious law-making are viewed with as obstacles to 'the people's wants'. A category of 'people', like ideas of nationalism, draws on imagined communities (Anderson 1983) . Populists choose who can be included in or excluded from the people and by which criteria to choose who belongs to the people (Stanley 2008) . Th e populist perception of 'the people' centres on the moralistic idea of sovereignty that belongs to the oppressed masses, and nothing should obstruct the will of the majority -tentatively represented by the populist politicians (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017) . In contrast, 'the elite' is seen as an immoral and self-interested liberal political, economic, business, culture and media establishment. Ergo, populism prevents compromise between the 'virtuous people' and the 'wicked elite'. Populists claim they are not part of the traditional political realm of corrupt politicians and are at ease with making broad promises, oft en with incompatible ends and next to undeliverable democracy and rule of law. Paradoxically, the anti-establishment populist rhetoric does not always go into oblivion. When populists participate in or rein the government, they allege that real power does not belong to the government, but to the 'foes of the people' and has to be re-taken from them. A dearth of trust in the democratic arrangements paves the way for charismatic and 'strongman' leaders who combine a plain-speaking, conspirational thinking and blaming, though blame is a usual suspect in any political debate. Nowadays, populists claim there is contradiction in liberal democracy, as can be seen as an illiberal democratic response to an undemocratic liberalism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017) . Democratic institutions and rule of law guarantee civic rights and freedoms (liberalism) against majority's will (democracy).
Populism is hardly defi ned as a separate ideology. At best it, with nationalism, feminism and ecologism, can be called a 'thin' ideology with limited ideational scope and ambition and decreased internal integration (Freeden 1996 (Freeden , 1998 . Paris Aslanidis (2016) considers populism as a communicative approach, a discourse to talk about politics rather than to have clear-cut features of ideology. Populist parties do not constitute a separate dimension of political confl ict but are scattered across the left -right axis. In a similar vein, the emergence of 'quality of life' values in the 1970s (Inglehart 1971 ) did not produce a material versus post-material confl ict, and the Green parties in Europe since the 1980s are characterised as left ist ideology.
Politics is linked with the confl ict of diff erent ideas and ideologies. According to Ernesto Laclau (2005) , confl ict is an intrinsic feature of political life where antagonism is unavoidable and consensus is sustainably challenged between 'we' and 'them'. A social and political status quo is always questioned not only by existing political actors, but also by the new ones. Political change occurs when demands for or against the existing political system result in change (Easton 1953) . Populism, thereby, is just another set of demands with a distinctive style of communication yet fi tting existent ideologies of the left or the right. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouff e (2001) argued that there is no space 'beyond left and right', and right-wing and left -wing populists are similar by contesting who is 'we'. Right-wing populism is exclusionary and focuses on nationalism, nativism and ethnicity while left ist populists have a more inclusionary approach about who 'the people' are.
Taking stock of the party system dynamics in Lithuania
Th e Lithuanian parliament, the Seimas, consists of 141 members. Th e electoral system in Lithuania is mixed-parallel. 71 mandates are elected in single-member districts using majoritarian rules with a two-round system; 70 members of parliament are chosen by using proportional rule in a country-wide constituency. Voters have two ballots: one for a party list in the country-wide constituency and another for a candidate in a single-mandate district. 1 Th e threshold for parties to enter the parliament is 5 percent and 7 percent for coalitions. A candidate who receives the majority of votes is elected to the parliament. If no candidate gets absolute majority of the votes cast, a run-off between the top two frontrunners is organised, and a contender obtaining the simple majority in the second round becomes a member of the Seimas. A minimal turnout for the proportional tier is 25 percent and 40 percent for a majoritarian one.
Parliamentary democracy in Lithuania started with the fi rst election to the Seimas in 1990. Th e pro-independence movement, Sąjūdis, led by Vytautas Landsbergis won an absolute majority. Diminishing support for the government led to an early election in 1992, and the ex-communist Lithuanian Labour Democratic Party, under the leadership of former Lithuanian communist Party leader Algirdas Brazauskas, won in a landslide. Aft er four years the Conservative Party, the off spring of the Sąjūdis, returned to power and made a coalition with the Christian Democrats. Aft er the 2000 election, two new 1
In a vote for a party list, a voter can rate up to fi ve candidates from the list they vote for. Th e number ratings that a candidate receives in the voted party list determines candidates' fi nal standings in the party's candidate list.
parties -the Lithuanian Liberal Union and the Social Liberals -formed a right-of-centre government, which collapsed aft er one year when the Social Liberals left the cabinet and joined the Social Democrats. In the 2004 election, other political newcomers -the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats (later renamed Party Order and Justice) and the Peasant and New Democracy Union -took almost half of the parliamentary seats. Although Labour got a 28 percent share, the smaller Social Democrats made a coalition with the Labour, the Peasants and the Liberal and Centre Union. Th e 2008 election witnessed a comeback of the Conservatives who wooed two small liberal parties and the populist National Resurrection Party into a government. Th e 2012 election brought back the Social Democrats to power -they ruled the entire term with the Labour and the Party Order and Justice. In 2016, the underdog of Lithuanian politics, the Peasants and Greens Union, won over 40 percent of parliamentary mandates and made a coalition with the faction of the Social Democrats. Th e Social Democrats and the Conservatives dominated the politics in the independence period. Since 2008, all the governments and prime ministers have served full terms.
In the 2016 parliamentary election, six parties stepped over the electoral threshold in the multi-member constituency. Th e parties of the ruling coalition (Social Democrats, Labour and Party Order and Justice) lost heavily in this election, and the number of representatives from the main opposition party -the Conservatives -shrank too. Th e main winner of the election was the Lithuanian Peasants and Greens Union, led Ramūnas Karbauskis. It became the largest parliamentary faction with 56 MPs. Th e party promised generous social benefi ts, professionals in politics and a fi ght against alcohol consumption while stressing on family and national values (darnilietuva.lt 2018). Th e Peasants saw themselves as an alternative, professional and scandal-free party compared to the Social Democrats and the Conservatives who had been running the country for the last 26 years. Most of the party's electorate arrived from the former constituencies of the Path of Courage, Labour, Order and Justice and the Social Democrats. Th e popularity of the Peasants increased because of one of the most popular politicians, Saulius Skvernelis, a former minister of interior, led the party's candidates list and eventually became prime minister. 2 Furthermore, the Peasants won easily in a run-off against the Conservatives, as the former were the least favoured choice in the electorate and the Peasants were second best.
Th e Social Democrats suff ered a serious defeat despite the party's calls for a strengthening of the middle class, reducing social disparities and increasing public sector investments (lsdpklaipeda.lt 2018). Th e key reasons for the party's fl op were poor party management and communication, favouritism, public spats with the President and neo-liberal economic policies. Aft er the election, the party, as a junior partner, joined the Peasants-led ruling coalition. 3 However, aft er one year, the Social Democrats decided to withdraw from the coalition and the parliamentary faction split in October 2017. 4 Th e Labour Party from the ruling coalition ended its meteoric dive that began in 2004. Th e Labour demonised refugees who were non-existent in the country and fl irted with Euroscepticism. How-2
Th e Peasants delegated speaker of the parliament and control 11 ministries out of 14. Th e party's chairman, Ramūnas Karbauskis, chairs the party's faction at the parliament.
3 Conservatives, the Liberals and Order and Justice decided to stay in the opposition. Th e Polish party announced it would support the government's socially conservative policies.
4 Th e splinter's members participate in the governing coalition and established the electorally insignifi cant Lithuanian Social Democratic Labour Party in March 2018. ever, pestered by the squabbles in the leadership, incompetence and corruption charges, the party did not cross the 5-percent threshold, losing 27 MPs, and having a paltry two seats from the run-off s. Th e Party Order and Justice, led by the formerly impeached president Paksas, ran on socially conservative, soft ly nationalistic and mildly Eurosceptic ideas (programa.tvarka.lt 2018). It barely made it to parliament with a small faction. Yet party's fortunes, like Labour's, had been dwindling since 2004 due to invariable leadership, internal spats and corruption allegations.
Th e opposition did not fare well. Th e Conservatives came second in the elections and fell short of forming a government for the second term in turn. Th e party supports market economy, social market, transatlantic orientation and anti-Kremlin stances (tsajunga.lt 2018). Th e Liberals barely scrambled over the electoral barrier due to allegations of corruption from the party's leader, Eligijus Masiulis, who lost his parliamentarian immunity before the elections. Th e Liberal party is all for capitalist market and left -of-centre moral values (liberalai.lt 2018). Th e Polish minority party, the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania -Christian Families Alliance, retained a minor faction at the Seimas, too. Th e party, led by Valdemar Tomaševski, represents Polish and partly Russian voters clustered in the south-eastern part of the country. Th e Polish party expanded its name to embrace Catholic values (awpl.lt 2018). Aft er the 2016 parliamentary elections, the party system shift ed from a moderate multi-party system with even distribution of parliamentary seats to a moderate multi-party system with the dominant party. Voter turnout dropped from 52.9 to 50.6 percent in the national tier between 2012 and 2016 yet increased from 35.9 to 38.1 percent in the run-off s. Voter volatility in the multi-member constituency went up from 30.0 to 37.1 percent. On the other hand, fragmentation of the party system had been decreasing since 2004. Th e number of eff ective electoral parties also dropped from 8.3 to 7.4 between the elections and the number of eff ective parliamentary parties plummeted from 5.3 to 4.4. Th e share of wasted votes grew from 12.8 to 18.4 percent, and the number of invalid votes remained slightly above 4 percent. Th e party system exhibits moderate pluralism with centripetal competition. In the last 10 years, the party system fragmentation has reduced as the share of new electoral and parliamentary parties has been diminishing. Voter volatility remained tangible, as every third voter shift ed their preferences between the parliamentary elections. Party competition remained centripetal, since no anti-system, openly populist or far-left / far-right parties enjoy popularity. Socio-economic issues are at the centre the left -right dimension. Th e Peasants draw their support from the provinces, the disadvantaged sector of the population and the anti-establishment mood. People in rural areas and small towns and the socially disadvantaged opt for left ist and new parties. Th e Conservative and Liberal voters largely come from big cities and urban, educated and economically better-off constituencies.
What's the story, populist parties?
Th e Lithuanian party system was relatively stable in the fi rst decade aft er the reestablishment of independence. Th e ex-communist Labour Democratic party and the Social Democrats dominated on the left and the Conservative and the Christian Democrats attracted voters on the right-of-centre. New parties with populist and anti-establishment streaks appeared on the brink of the new millennium. Th e Labour Party and the Party Order Populist and protest parties had mixed results in the elections to the European Parliament and local elections that are organised according to the proportional formula. Such parties were most popular at the time of their entry into politics and then gradually lost their appeal. 6 Aft er the impeachment of the Lithuanian president and long-time leader of the Party Order and Justice, Paksas, in 2004, none of the candidates from the Labour and Order and Justice had success in presidential elections. Th e Constitutional Court barred Paksas from running as a candidate and leader of the Labour Party, Viktor Uspaskich, had never participated in presidential elections. Th e parties did not have candidates in the 2004 presidential election, which was won by Valdas Adamkus with 51.9 percent in the run-off against Kazimira Prunskienė. In 2009, Valentinas Mazuronis from the Order and Justice took 'bronze' with over 6 percent and Loreta Graužinienė from the Labour Party ended in sixth place in the election with less than 4 percent of the vote. Dalia Grybauskaitė won the 5
Th e anti-corruption coalition of N. Puteikis and K. Krivickas (Lithuanian Centre Party and Lithuanian Pensioners' Party) did not get any seats in the proportional tier as the coalition did not cross the 7 percent threshold required for coalitions participating in parliamentary elections. Only the chairman of the Lithuanian Centre Party, Naglis Puteikis, won in a single-mandate district. Puteikis, while fuelling anti-establishment rhetoric, had also stood as a candidate in the 2014 presidential election and received 4.9 percent of the votes. 6 Low-scoring parties with populist and protest appeal are not included in the tables as they received under 1 percent of votes in Seimas elections.
7 Th e results of the local elections in March 2019 revealed the popularity of societal committees. Diff erent ad hoc political organisations competed with political parties in diff erent municipalities and received 26.8 percent of all votes cast.
8 Th e nationalist Centre Party led by Naglis Puteikis mustered 4.9 percent. Only the Labour Party received one MEP out of 11. presidential election in the fi rst round with 68.2 percent of votes. In 2014, Grybauskaitė was re-elected with 57.9 percent for a second term in the run-off against a Social Democrat Zigmantas Balčytis. 
One-man show fi nale: leadership at party Order and Justice
Paksas, perhaps, could be a champion of political renegades in Lithuania, as he has been a member in six parties and movements during the post-independence period. Th e former aerobatics champion in the Soviet Union and a construction businessman entered politics in the early 1980s as a member of Lithuanian Communist Party. With the arrival of independence in 1990, he continued his membership in the ex-communist Lithuanian Labour Democratic Party that won the 1992 parliamentary elections. He rose in the ranks until becoming a member of the party's council. Aft er the ex-communists lost the Seimas election in 1996, he abandoned them and switched to the winners, the Conservative party, in 1997 and became a chairman of its coordination board for Vilnius County. In the 1997 municipal elections, the Conservatives received the biggest share of votes both in the country and the capital, and Paksas, who led the party list (vrk.lt 1997), became a member of the municipal council which elected him as mayor of Vilnius, a position he held until June 1999. Th en the Conservatives chose him to run the ninth government of Lithuania. His premiership had lasted only a few months: in October the same year, he resigned from the offi ce, protesting against unacceptable privatisation conditions of selling the oil refi nery "Mažeikių naft a" to the US company Williams International. Not long aft er, Paksas hopped from the Conservatives to the Lithuanian Liberal Union, becoming its chairman in December 1999 and advisor to President Valdas Adamkus. In the 2000 municipal elections, the Liberals, led by Paksas, won 18 mandates out of 51 in the municipal council of Vilnius, and Paksas became a member of the municipal council and was elected mayor for the second time (vrk.lt 2000). His second mayorship lasted for a half a year until he ran for parliament in October 2000 and was elected in the Antakalnio single-mandate district (vrk.lt 2000). 14 Th e Liberals, under his leadership, in turn crossed the 9
Th e Labour Party did not raise their own candidate and supported Petras Auštrevičius from the Liberal and Centre Union Party.
10 Th e Labour Party did not raise their own candidate and supported an independent Gitanas Nausėda in the second round of the presidential election.
11 Th e party's leader, Rolandas Paksas, supported a candidate in Kazimira Danutė Prunskienė from the Union of Peasants and New Democracy in the 2004 presidential elections.
12 Th e party's leader, Paksas, supported a candidate in Zigmantas Balčytis from the Social Democratic Party in the 2014 presidential elections.
13 Party Order and Justice neither raised a candidate nor supported other candidates in the run-off of the presidential election.
14 Rolandas Paksas received 49.5 percent and was elected in the fi rst round, since the majoritarian 2003 (vrk.lt 2002) . Since Lithuanian law forbids party members to be the president, Paksas resigned from the leadership of the Liberal Union party. 17 However, his presidency did not last long. Suspicions arose over his links to the Russian underworld. President Paksas interfered into privatisation processes and granted Lithuanian citizenship to a wealthy Russian businessman who generously fi nanced his electoral campaign. Th e State Security department initiated the investigation that led to his impeachment, the fi rst of that kind in Europe. Th e Constitution Court found Paksas guilty of breaking the presidential oath on several occasions and violating the Constitution in March 2004. In April, the Seimas passed the vote to impeach the president who, instead of serving for fi ve years, served in offi ce for 13 months and 11 days. In turn, the Constitution Court barred him indefi nitely from holding any offi ce that requires a constitutional oath. 18 Aft erwards, Paksas returned to politics by re-taking the position of leader in the party in December 2004.
Since then, Paksas could not participate in presidential and parliamentary elections. He led his party in the local elections in the capital in 2007 and was elected to the council of Vilnius municipality (vrk.lt 2007) . He resigned from the municipality in 2009 due to his participation in the election to the European Parliament and ran successfully for the Eu- In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights established that the lifetime ban to be elected to the parliament was disproportionate and violated the European Convention of Human Rights that guarantees a right to participation in elections. In December 2013, the Lithuanian parliament voted against a constitutional amendment enabling an impeached politician to run for parliament. Another vote, to allow an impeached person to participate in presidential and parliamentary elections ten years aft er the impeachment, took place in October 2018 and was 16votes short to amend the Constitution and pave the way of the participation for Rolandas Paksas in elections. In December 2018, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe urged the Lithuanian parliament to implement the decision of the European Court of Human Rights.
(vrk.lt 2014). He joined Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group at the European Parliament in 2014. Aft er the party's dismal results in the 2016 parliamentary elections, Paksas resigned from the chairmanship of the party in September 2016. 19 Currently, Paksas is a member of the European Parliament, but his attachment to the party is over. Due to internal disagreements, he withdrew from the party in September 2018 and established a societal electoral committee called the 'Movement of President Rolandas Paksas'. It participated in the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 and got 3.8 percent of the vote and no seats at the European Parliament (vrk.lt 2019). Paksas has also registered a societal movement named 'I Call for the Nation' and intends to rally "patriotic Lithuanian forces in the Europe of nations" (15min.lt 2019). 20 Th e Party Order and Justice has long been associated with Paksas as its leader. He has steered the party virtually all the time and did not consider resigning despite the party's fading luck since 2008. Paksas has been playing the victim card aft er his impeachment and actively sought the 'restoration of justice', thus eff ectively remaining as the party's leader. Th e only interim de jure chairman of the party was Valentinas Mazuronis, a former architect who got involved in politics by joining the ranks of the Lithuanian Liberal Union in 1993. He participated in the 1996 parliamentary election. Th e Liberal Union received 1.84 percent of votes and Mazuronis ended as number 22 in the party list aft er the election (vrk. lt 1996) . He was also a candidate in the Aušros constituency and took eighth place among 13 contestants (vrk.lt 1996) . With the split of the Liberal Union, he switched to the newly established Liberal Democrat party, becoming the right hand of Paksas and his fi rst deputy. Mazuronis has been electorally active ever since by taking part in all elections. In the 2004 parliamentary election, Mazuronis led on the party's list, which got 11.4 percent of the vote and with nine MPs in the multi-member constituency (vrk.lt 2004) . He was elected to the Seimas becoming the party's chairman (vrk.lt 2004) . However, he failed to obtain a seat in the Dainų constituency fi nishing the fourth with 13.1 percent of the votes (vrk.lt 2004). Mazuronis led the party list (vrk.lt 2008) that fi nished third with 12.7 percent of the votes (vrk.lt 2008) and he was re-elected to the parliament in 2008. Also, he received 13.1 percent of votes in the Dainų constituency in the fi rst round (vrk.lt 2008) and went for the run-off in which he lost with 29.9 percent (vrk.lt 2008). Mazuronis tried his chances in the 2009 presidential elections and received 6.1 percent, ending up the third among seven candidates (vrk.lt 2009). He repeated his success in the 2012 Seimas elections, topping party's list (vrk.lt 2012) which attracted 7.3 percent of the votes in the multi-member constituency (six parliamentary seats). In similar fashion, his results in the Dainų single-mandate district was second with 14.3 percent in the fi rst round (vrk.lt 2012), followed with 37.0 percent in which he lost the run-off (vrk.lt 2012). Aft er the elections, the Party Order and Justice with the Labour and Polish parties joined the ruling Social Democrat-led coalition and Mazuronis became Minister of the Environment. In the 2014 election to the European Parliament he was number three on the list, and the party won two seats. Nonetheless, the party's constituency ranked Mazuronis as number two and he became a member of the European Parliament (vrk.lt 2014). Now he belongs to the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (europarl.europa.eu 2015) . Due to disagreements with Paksas about his replacement in the party leadership, Mazuronis left the Party Order and Justice in February 2015 and joined 19 Th e Party Order and Justice elected a new chairman, Remigijus Žemaitatis in December 2016. 20
In early 2019, the General Prosecutor's Offi ce presses corruption charges in court against Rolandas Paksas' activities in 2015. the Labour party, becoming its chairman in May 2015. He did not take part in the 2016 Seimas elections with the Labour Party which fell short of the 5 percent needed to enter parliament. Mazuronis resigned from the party's leadership in October 2016 and suspended his membership in December the same year due to his disapproval to the new leader of the Labour Party. Finally, Mazuronis participated as an independent candidate in the presidential election in May 2019 and fi nished the last among nine candidates with barely 0.65 percent of the votes. Now Mazuronis considers returning to the Labour Party (klaipeda.diena.lt 2019).
Th e current chairman of the Party Order and Justice, Remigijus Žemaitaitis, started his political career in 2007 as an adviser to Vilnius mayor Juozas Imbrasas and served this stint also for the former party leader Paksas. Žemaitaitis' fi rst attempt in the parliamentary elections in 2008 was successful. He was number 45 in the party list yet was ranked by the party's electorate into the parliament and became a member of Committee on Legal Aff airs. On the other hand, he ended third in the fi rst round in the Šilalės-Šilutės constituency with 6.8 percent (vrk.lt 2008) . Another attempt was in the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. His position in the party list was number 16, and the party won two seats (vrk.lt 2009). In the parliamentary election of 2012, Žemaitaitis stood as number 12, yet the party received six mandates in the proportional vote. However, he won the Šilalės-Šilutės constituency in the run-off with 69.6 percent (vrk.lt 2012) and became a chairman of the Committee on Economy in the Seimas. In the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, Žemaitaitis was sixth on the list (vrk.lt 2014) and was not elected, as the party received two seats. In the 2016 parliamentary election, Žemaitaitis led the party list and was elected to the Seimas in the proportional vote; he also won the Pietų Žemaitijos constituency with 66.3 percent in the run-off two weeks later and his party obtained an additional MP from the party list (vrk.lt 2016). He became head of the party's faction and member of two committees: Rural Aff airs and Health Aff airs. In September 2018 the parliament elected him as deputy speaker of the Seimas (seimas.lt 2018). In the 2019 municipal election, Žemaitaitis ran for mayor and out of 17 candidates ended up as number 10 with 1.15 percent of the votes (vrk.lt 2019). Finally, Žemaitaitis led his Party Order and Justice in the elections to the European Parliament. Th e party got 2.6 percent of votes and fi nished with no seats in the EP. Given the incredibly high numbers of support for the party's leadership at congresses and next to non-existent contest for the chairpersonship, it hardly comes as a surprise that a party leader has immense intra-party power according to party's statute. First of all, a leader is considered as a single-person governing body who is elected for two years at the congress and possesses broad competences. Th ey submit candidates of their fi rst deputy, other deputies and chairman of discipline commission and the whole control commission for the approval of the party congress. Th ey can choose personal advisers without consent of other party's bodies. A chairperson also submits the party's secretary for the approval of the executive board. Th e secretary runs the party's day-to-day aff airs. In case the executive committee does not appoint a secretary, one of the chairman's deputies heads the secretariat. A leader also convenes the congress 22 and delivers a report on party's activities. Besides, the party's chairperson chooses heads and deputies of committees for the executive committee's approval. A leader chairs executive committee meetings that 22 A right to convene a congress also belongs to one-third of all party members, half of the party's branches, the council and, in special cases, the executive committee.
can terminate mandates of the executive committee's deputy and members. An executive committee is the party's political and managerial governing institution, consisting of a presidium and ten members from local branches. 23 Th e presidium, convened and chaired by a leader of the party, runs a party between executive committee's meetings, convened at least twice a year and consists of party's chairperson, deputies and head of party's faction at the parliament. An executive committee is closely connected to the party's leaders, since the change of a chairperson automatically triggers an election of a new executive committee at the congress. Th e presidium submits candidates for parliamentary elections in the multi-member constituency (the party's candidate list) and candidates for the election to the European Parliament for the executive committee's approval. Th e executive committee, in turn, prepares the party programme, establishes quotas for participants in the party congress, approves of the party's fi nancial reports, sets up the party's committees, submits candidates for the elections to the Seimas and the European Parliament for the approval of the congress and submits a candidate for the presidential election for the approval of party's council. 24 Th e executive committee submits regulations of the council for the congress and approves regulations of the presidium, control commission and municipal and regional coordination councils. Upon the suggestion of the commission on discipline, the executive committee can dismiss the executive committee's deputy, an executive committee and a party member and freeze a mandate of a chair of a local branch. Since the executive committee votes according to simple majority, the chair's vote is decisive in case of a draw in voting. 25 Th e overview of the party's statute reveals broad intraparty competences of the party leader, who is recognised as a single-person ruling body at the party. Th e party's chairperson convenes a party congress and seeks its approval for the leader's chosen deputies and heads of two commissions that foresee the party's inner workings. As for the council, which is number two in the party's hierarchy, the leader summons the council and their chosen fi rst deputy chairs it. Th e concentration of powers of the party's frontrunner lies within the 'government' of the party, being the executive committee and the presidium. As the chairman of the executive committee, a leader runs the show: chairs its meetings, selects candidates for elections, sets up the party's internal institutions, controls members of the executive committee, prepares regulations and oversees the party's fi nances. Even for the secretariat at the administrative level, the party's leader chooses the secretary or has the leader's chosen deputy to run as secretariat.
Conclusions
Th e article discussed the conceptualisation of populism, institutionalisation and dynamics of populist parties in Lithuania, party system development and shed light on the leadership performance, change and legal capacity in the Party Order and Justice. Th e 23
Party members of the parliamentary faction, a secretary, heads of Vilnius, Kaunas and regional coordination councils can vote in the executive committee's meeting. 24 A council is the highest ‚legislative' body between party congresses. It is made of heads of local branches and party committees, executive committee members, head of commission on discipline and members of the parliamentary faction. Th e party's leader or one third of the council's members convene the council. Th e fi rst deputy, chosen by the party's leader, chairs the council.
25
In case of the party leader's absence, a draw in voting implies a non-decision.
Lithuanian party system now shows decreasing and moderate fragmentation and centripetal competition. Th e number of eff ective electoral parties is just above four. On the other hand, voter volatility scores remain relatively high -one in three voters changed their voting preferences between the two last elections. Th e share of new parties has been dropping since 2004, and no new parties entered the parliament in 2016. Populism in Lithuania fell on deaf electorate's ears. It did not take long for former populist parties to join the mainstream by taking part in ruling coalitions and cooperation since 2012 and ditching their own populist zeal. New topics of populism emerged, yet they fell short of becoming a credible alternative to established parties. Th e protest and populist parties in Lithuania did not take root and they squandered once robust electoral support. Th e case of Party Order and Justice revealed the party's close association with its former chair, an impeached president of Lithuania Rolandas Paksas. His intra-party supported clinging to party's leadership and an emphasis on political martyrdom and self-victimisation after the impeachment resulted in the party's dwindling fortunes and his resignation both from the leadership and the party. However, Paksas' long-term legacy left the party's internal regulations favourable next to unconstrained leadership at the Party Order and Justice. Th e presidential and European Parliamentary elections in May 2019 did not become harbingers of populist tendencies. Former leaders of populist and protest parties have been in gradual decline or political extinction and the new ones did not make any tangible inroads in Lithuanian politics.
